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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order dismissing Wesly Standley’s petition for postconviction relief. Relief should be granted because the district court erred in
dismissing Mr. Standley’s claim that the attorney who represented him at the
probation revocation proceedings was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. That
order should be reversed and the matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
1. Criminal case proceedings
Mr. Standley pleaded guilty to a charge of Possession of Heroin with the
Intent to Deliver. R 5.
While on pre-trial release, Mr. Standley entered into a drug addiction
treatment program, supervised by David Hadlock, M.D., which consisted of three
phases. Dr. Hadlock, who is board certified in addiction medicine and holds a
Master’s Degree in addiction counseling, included Suboxone treatment in the
program. T pg. 8, ln 3-13; pg. 9, ln. 11. Suboxone is a medication for those who are
addicted to opiates. It contains a synthetic opiate (buprenorphine) and a second
drug (naltrexone) that is intended to counteract the euphoric effect of the opiate.
Suboxene is designed to stop drug cravings, while at the same time preventing the
user from getting high either from the synthetic opiate or from other opiates. T pg.
1

A true and correct copy of the Clerk’s Record and Transcripts from the
direct appeal were attached to the Post-Conviction Petition. R 7.
1

15, ln. 11 - pg. 16, ln. 25; pg. 23, ln. 2-13.
The first phase of treatment was the Intensive Outpatient Treatment
program. Mr. Standley successfully completed the IOP, which required 30 group
sessions, each lasting three hours, over a 10-week session, with at least five sessions
of individual counseling. T pg. 26, ln. 13-25. Mr. Standley then completed the
Relapse Prevention program, which lasted 12 weeks. He was in the ongoing
Aftercare Program, with group sessions and individual counseling. T pg. 27, ln. 822. Mr. Standley also attended NA meetings. T pg. 31, ln. 1-16. Dr. Hadlock
testified Mr. Standley “basically has done everything I could possibly could have
asked him to do in regards to reprogramming.” T pg. 14, ln. 24-25.
At sentencing, the state recommended a twelve-year sentence with four years
fixed. Of importance to this appeal, it noted “we do not believe that [a life sentence]
is something that is appropriate[.]” T pg. 40, ln. 5-23. Mr. Standley asked the court
to impose a stricter sentence of twelve years with nine years fixed, but to grant him
one chance by suspending the sentence and granting probation. T pg. 40, ln. 14-24.
The court, noting neither party was going to “like this sentence” imposed the
maximum sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years fixed and the maximum fine
of $25,000, suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Standley on ten years probation.
T pg. 51, ln. 8-12; R 167. The court imposed what might be called a “one and done”
probation. It noted, “This is an all or nothing sentence for Wesly Standley, because
I am of the firm belief, Mr. Standley, that if you go back to using drugs, you will go
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back to dealing, and we will be right back here again.” T pg. 54, ln. 20-23. The
court continued, “So hear out what I’m saying here. You come back on a probation
violation, you’re gone.” T pg. 55, ln. 11-12.
One of the general conditions of probation was Mr. Standley “shall not
associate with any person(s) designated by any agent of IDOC.” R 185. Another
general condition required Mr. Standley to “meaningfully participate in and
successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other programs deemed
beneficial to the Defendant and as directed by the Court or any agent of the IDOC.”
R 183. The court also imposed several special terms of probation, one of which
required:
The defendant shall complete the Suboxene program that he is
currently enrolled in through Dr. David R. Hadlock’s office. If the
defendant quits the program prior to the completion date as
recommended by Dr. Hadlock, such conduct shall constitute a
probation violation.
R 190; T pg. 58, ln. 8-11.
The court stated, “I’m here to tell you, Mr. Standley, that is, in fact, a zerotolerance probation.” It concluded:
Here’s the things that will get you in trouble: Obviously using alcohol,
it’s a trigger; using any drugs, that’s clearly going to violate you;
associating with people you shouldn’t associate with. . . . Your
probation officer has the authority to tell you who to not associate
with.
T pg. 58, ln. 13-20. There was no objection to the zero-tolerance provision and Mr.
Standley accepted the terms of the probation. T pg. 58, ln. 25 - pg. 59, ln. 9. No
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Notice of Appeal was filed from the judgment and sentence.
2. Probation violation proceedings
The state filed a motion to revoke probation alleging two probation violations.
Count I alleged Mr. Standley had “unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and
Matt Lewis, who are both under IDOC supervision.” R 200. Count II alleged he
was “failing to take his Suboxene medication as prescribed. And therefore failing to
participate in the Suboxene Program with Dr. Hadlock as ordered by the Court.” R
200. Mr. Standley entered a denial to those allegations. R 216.
(a) Count I
Probation Officer Frank Neumeyer testified that during a probationary
search of Mr. Standley’s home, another P.O. noted some “odd texts” on a cell phone
“that just didn’t seem right.” T pg. 63, ln. 12-14. Mr. Standley told P.O. Neumeyer
that the texts were from Danielle Schreiner and he had in-person contact with her
too. Ms. Schrenier was on probation and a participant in Drug Court. The cell
phone also showed a phone call to Matt Lewis’ number. Mr. Lewis was also on
probation. T pg. 63, ln. 9-25. Copies of the text messages were admitted into
evidence. T pg. 67, ln. 8-9; State’s Exhibit 1. Some of them showed that Mr.
Standley was aware Ms. Schrenier was on probation. T pg. 71, ln. 20 - pg. 72, ln. 4.
The text message exchange between them was initiated by her. She texted Mr.
Standley with the message she just saw Matt Lewis, who wants to contact him. It
may be she is seeking drugs from Mr. Standley for both herself (claiming she had
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hurt her back) and for Mr. Lewis, who she claims “likes the opiates big time.” Mr.
Standley says she could take a quarter of a strip of Suboxene for the pain. State’s
Exhibit 1 (Evidentiary Hearing).
The court originally found Count I had not been proved, noting:
The provision that is alleged to have been violated is number 24 of the
general conditions. Mr. Standley acknowledged or says, the defendant
shall not associate with any persons designated by any agent of IDOC.
The allegation is that he had unauthorized contact. What’s lacking in
this case is evidence that he was told of this condition, and maybe we
do this case again. I don’t know. That’s your choice. But I am not
going to find that he is in violation of Count 1 because the State has
simply not presented substantial evidence on that allegation.
T pg. 112, ln. 4-13.
After the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the state filed a second Ex
Parte Motion to Revoke Probation. R 227. The single count alleged Mr. Standley
had “unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who are both
known felons and under IDOC supervision.” R 228. This allegation was
substantially similar to the original Count I which alleged Mr. Standley had
“unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who are both under
IDOC supervision.” R 191.
This second probation violation proceeded to an evidentiary hearing without
objection from defense counsel. After hearing additional evidence, the court took
judicial notice of the general condition of probation #24, which prohibited Mr.
Standley from associating with any person designated by the IDOC. It continued:
“It is undisputed that Alice McClain [a probation officer] told Mr. Standley at the
5

time he signed up for probation that he was not allowed to associate with any
known felons, anyone in the speciality courts, or anyone involved in criminal
conduct without the permission of an IDOC officer.” T pg. 157, ln. 7-11. Defense
counsel conceded and the court found Mr. Standley had prohibited contact with Ms.
Schriener. It did not find he had prohibited contact with Mr. Lewis. T pg. 157, ln.
19 - pg. 159, ln. 20.
(b) Count II
During the search of Mr. Standley’s home, the probation officer found Mr.
Standley had not been taking all of the Suboxene prescribed to him. During a time
period where Mr. Standley should have taken 44 strips, only ten were missing from
his prescription box. When questioned, Mr. Standley said “he was trying to wean
himself off that prescription.” T pg. 73, ln. 24-25.
Mr. Standley agreed as part of the Suboxene program treatment to take the
medication only as prescribed and to not skip or adjust the dose on his own. T pg.
75, ln. 5-12; State’s Exhibit 2, pg. 1.
Dr. Hadlock testified Mr. Standley had been participating in all components
of the Suboxene program and Mr. Standley’s performance was “phenomenal.” T pg.
82, ln. 22. Dr. Hadlock explained it is “addict behavior” for patients “to actually
practice medicine on themselves” and part of the goal of treatment is “to change
that behavior, that’s part of the addictive behavior.” T pg. 83, ln. 22 - pg. 84, ln. 4.
And, while the treatment agreement requires patients to take the medication as
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prescribed, only about 70% of patients who are required to take medications twice a
day, as Mr. Standley was, actually do so and noncompliance “is a national problem.”
T pg. 84, ln. 25.
The doctor noted Suboxene works so well in stopping the craving mechanism
it is not uncommon for patients to forget to take it. Unlike other medications, when
patients miss a dose of Suboxene they are instructed to not take it. “[W]ith
Suboxene, if you miss a dose you’re instructed specifically don’t take the dose.” T
pg. 85, ln. 1-8. The doctor testified the problem occurs when patients use extra
strips, not when they miss a strip. “I don’t want them to use extra without
permission. If they forget a strip, that kind of follows the national standards. The
medication has such a long half life that it will actually stay in their system for
three days so they won’t have withdrawals by missing a strip.” T pg. 85, ln. 17-22.
Missing a strip does not worry the doctor, instead, “I’m worried . . . when they take
extra strips, that would be addict behavior.” T pg. 90, ln. 18-20. He noted Mr.
Standley could have accumulated the extra strips if he had missed just five strips a
month of the approximately 60 prescribed for each of the ten months he had been in
treatment. T pg. 96, ln. 22-25.
The doctor testified Mr. Standley was still in his Suboxene program and
special arrangements had been made for him since he was in jail. T pg. 90, ln. 2325. The state did not present any evidence that Mr. Standley had not meaningfully
participated in the treatment, notwithstanding the violation of one of the terms of
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the agreement. The doctor explained the treatment agreement is “not a legal
document,” but is only intended to set out the ground rules for treatment. It is
common for the patients to be noncompliant and the doctor gives them “some
latitude” when they have violations of the agreement. T pg. 88, ln. 19-20; pg. 89, ln.
4-11.
When asked if Mr. Standley was noncompliant with the program, the doctor
answered:
No. That’s – all of his urines have been clean for me and for his
probation officers on a weekly basis. He’s attended IOP aftercare,
relapse prevention. He still was attending community support
meetings. I wish I could get the rest of my patients to be that
compliant in the education piece because the medication piece is just a
small piece. He took to that and was actually leading some of the
meetings, from what I was told by his counselors.
T pg. 100, ln. 12-19.
Nevertheless, the court found Mr. Standley had violated the special condition
that he complete Dr. Hadlock’s treatment program. The court ruled:
So there were two components of that order. One component is if he
quits, he violates probation, no question about it. And second, that he
complete the program. Well, there is no question in my mind that Mr.
Standley has not followed that program like he was directed. I don’t
care whether Officer Neumeyer thinks it’s a violation or not, I don’t
care whether Dr. Hadlock thinks it was a violation or not. And clearly
failing to follow the prescribed routine of taking two Suboxenes a day
was the deal. It’s not up to Mr. Standley to make that decision. I could
care less whether 90 percent or a hundred percent of the world failed
under these programs and failed to follow the instructions. That’s not
the issue. The issue is you were told what to do. You made a different
decision. That isn’t a medical issue. It is an issue, Mr. Standley, very
simply that you on your own decided to change the program. That
violates the probation, and you are, in fact, in violation of probation on
8

Count 2.
T pg. 113, ln. 11 - pg. 114, ln. 3.
(c) Disposition
The court revoked probation, imposed the life sentence and announced it
would not reduce the sentence. T pg. 181, ln. 25 - pg. 182, ln. 1.
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 271.
3. Direct Appeal
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion.
State v. Standley, No. 43024, 2016 WL 556365 (Ct. App. 2016). R 9.2
Mr. Standley argued on appeal there was not sufficient evidence to prove he
committed Count II of the first motion for probation violation. The Court of Appeals
did not address the argument because defense counsel “conceded there was
unapproved contact with Schreiner that violated his probation.” State v. Standley,
2016 WL 556365, at *3.
4. Post-conviction petition
Mr. Standley filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. R 5. He alleged
his right to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 688 (1984), had been violated. Specifically, defense counsel’s performance at
the probation revocation proceedings was deficient because she failed to object to a
second evidentiary hearing on Count I, which the court found had not been proved
2

A true and correct copy of the Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion was
attached to the Post-Conviction Petition. R 7.
9

at the first hearing. This deficient performance was prejudicial because relitigation
of Count I was barred by res judicata, there was insufficient evidence to prove
Count II, and because the court relied upon the violation and the facts presented at
the second hearing when it revoked probation, imposed sentence, and refused to
reduce the sentence. R 10-17.
On February 7, 2017, Mr. Standley filed a Motion for Summary Disposition,
noting the state had not filed a responsive pleading within the 30 days permitted by
I.C. § 19-4906(a). R 351-52. On February 16, the state filed an Answer admitting
all of the factual allegations in the Petition. R 354. It also filed a Cross-Motion for
Summary Disposition. R 403. Mr. Standley filed a response to the cross-motion. R
406.
Mr. Standley argued summary disposition in his favor was appropriate
because the record showed trial counsel was deficient as she did not object to the
relitigation of Count I of the Probation Violations, even though it was barred by the
issue preclusion aspect of the res judicata doctrine. R 406-414. Mr. Standley also
argued he was prejudiced by the deficient performance because there was
insufficient evidence he violated Count II. R 414-416.
After holding a hearing on the cross-motions, the court granted the state’s
cross-motion. It first held the issue of whether res judicata applied to probation
violation proceedings could have been raised on direct appeal. R 425. (The court
later corrected this error after post-judgment motions. R 470.) It also held the

10

requirements of res judicata were not met in the probation violation case “because
the initial ruling on Count I was not a final judgment for purposes of res judicata.”
R 427. It concluded, “since res judicata did not apply to the second evidentiary
hearing, counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object.” R 427. In
doing so, the court relied upon the case of State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho 327, 193 P.3d
874 (2008). R 427. It also found “that there was sufficient evidence to support a
violation on Count II.” R 428.
A judgment was filed. R 419. Mr. Standley filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
the Judgment, which was denied by the district court. R 431; 469. He also filed a
Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the iCourt dockets in State v. Shawn Dempsey,
Ada Co. CR-FE-1999-1070, and State of Idaho vs. Shawn Dempsey, Ada Co.
CR-FE-2002-617. True and correct copies of the dockets were attached to the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend. R 440-460; 467.
The court denied the Motion to Alter or Amend. R 470. It never ruled upon
the Motion to Take Judicial Notice. A timely notice of appeal was filed. R 472. An
Amended Judgment was filed. R 478. An Amended Notice of Appeal timely
followed. R 483.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the court err in dismissing the petition because there was a material
question of fact whether counsel’s performance was deficient?
B. Did the court err in dismissing the petition because there was a material
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question of fact whether Mr. Standley was prejudiced by the deficient performance?
C. Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to rule on the motion for
judicial notice?
IV. ARGUMENT
Introduction
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has been incorporated through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). A criminal defendant has the constitutional right
to assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. State v. Ruth,
102 Idaho 638, 641, 637 P.2d 415, 418 (1981); State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239, 242,
697 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Ct. App.1985). The right to counsel extends to probation
revocation proceedings. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 283, 833 P.2d 911, 916
(1992); State v. Lindsay, 124 Idaho 825, 828, 864 P.2d 663, 666 (Ct. App.1993);
State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998). This right to
counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to
counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; I.C. § 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon
the state or federal constitution and irrespective of the stage of the proceedings, is
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analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, supra, standard. In order to
prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) counsel’s performance was
deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and
2) this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. at 689. The
prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability a different
result would have been obtained if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
As explained below, defense counsel’s performance at the probation
revocation proceedings was deficient because she failed to object to a second
evidentiary hearing on the same allegation the court found had not been proved.
This deficient performance was prejudicial because there was insufficient evidence
to prove Count II and because the court relied upon the violation and the facts
presented at the second hearing when it revoked probation, imposed sentence, and
refused to reduce the sentence.
A.

The evidence establishes a prima facie case that counsel’s
performance was deficient because she failed to object to the filing of
the second ex parte motion to revoke probation after the court had
already found the state had not proved the same allegation in the
first motion.
Defense counsel’s failure to object to the second motion for probation

violation, which realleged the allegation the court found was not proved at the
evidentiary hearing, was deficient performance.
1. There is no rule or statutory authority for relitigation
Relitigation of the probation violation was not authorized by any court rule or
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statute. Absent such authority, defense counsel’s failure to object was objectively
unreasonable as there could not be a strategic reason to allow the state a second
opportunity to prove the allegations. See, McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571, 225
P.3d 700, 704 (2010) (deficient performance shown when there was “no conceivable
tactical justification for trial counsel’s failure to object” to an erroneous jury
instruction).
2. Res judicata also precluded the relitigation
Defense counsel’s failure to object to the relitigation of Count I was also
deficient because it is well-established res judicata applies in probation violation
cases. State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho 327, 328-31, 193 P.3d 874, 875-78 (Ct. App.
2008). The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Issue
preclusion protects litigants from having to relitigate an identical issue with the
same party or its privy. Rodriguez v. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,
403 (2001). Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the
relitigation of an issue:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2)
the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded
was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the
litigation.
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123–24, 157 P.3d 613, 617–18 (2007).
14

Here, all five factors were present. The prosecuting attorney had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first evidentiary hearing. The issue
decided in the first hearing was identical to the issue presented in the second. That
issue was actually decided in the first hearing and the party against whom the issue
was asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.3 Lastly, as
explained in more detail below, there was a final judgment on the merits.
3. There was a final judgment for purposes of res judicata
The post-conviction court erred by concluding there was no final judgment for
purposes of res judicata. There was a final judgment in this case because the court
found there was insufficient evidence to prove the allegations in Count I and “[a]
judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to a part of an action although the
litigation continues as to the rest.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982).
Comment (g) to § 13, goes on to note “that the decision was subject to appeal or was
in fact reviewed on appeal [is a factor] supporting the conclusion that the decision is
final for the purpose of preclusion.” Here, there was a final judgment for res
judicata purposes because the court found the state had proved Count II, but not
proved Count I. The state could have appealed from that ruling in the event the
court decided to reinstate probation. I.A.R. 11(c)(9). If the court decided to revoke
probation based solely on Count II, the state could have obtained appellate review
when Mr. Standley appealed. Idaho Appellate Rule 11(g), provides:

3

There is no dispute these elements of res judicata were present.
15

After an appeal has been filed from a judgment . . .a timely
cross-appeal may be filed from any interlocutory or final judgment
order or decree. If no affirmative relief is sought by way of reversal,
vacation or modification of the judgment, order or decree, an issue may
be presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under
Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal.
Thus, all the requirements for the application of res judicata were present in
the criminal case.
Moreover, an examination of the facts in State v. Dempsey, supra., shows that
a judgment may be final for res judicata purpose even though it is not final for
purposes of appeal. Mr. Dempsey was on probation on a 1999 conviction when he
pleaded guilty to a new charge in 2002. He was sentenced on the 2002 conviction to
ten years, with one year fixed, to be served consecutively to the 1999 probation. The
2002 sentence was suspended and Dempsey was placed on probation. The state
later alleged Dempsey had violated his probations. After the evidentiary hearing in
the 1999 case, the district judge found Dempsey willfully violated the terms of his
probation by failing to participate in sex offender treatment. Thereafter, the state
filed a motion in the 2002 case requesting the district court apply the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to find Dempsey violated the terms of his probation in the second
case by failing to participate in sex offender treatment.
At a hearing set by the district court, the state relied on a certified copy of an
audio recording of the oral ruling by the district judge in the 1999 case. Dempsey
objected to the use of collateral estoppel to find he had committed a probation
violation in the present case. The district court, however, noted it had listened to
16

the audio recording and ruled the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to
the state's alleged probation violation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
writing:
The test of when collateral estoppel should apply is: (1) whether the
party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) whether
the issue decided in the previous litigation is identical to the current
issue presented; (3) whether the issue was actually decided in the
previous litigation and whether the issue was necessary to the prior
judgment; (4) whether the final judgment was on the merits; and (5)
whether the party who the judgment is asserted against was a party or
in privity with the party to the prior judgment.
State v. Dempsey, supra. The Court of Appeals then held “that the district court
properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar Dempsey from relitigating
the issue of whether he willfully violated the terms of his probation in the present
case.” Id.
However, the first probation violation proceeding was not final for purposes of
appeal at the time it was used at petitioner’s second proceeding. This is apparent
because the Dempsey Court noted “the state relied on a certified copy of an audio
recording of the oral ruling by the district judge in the 1999 case” as proof of the
court’s finding. 146 Idaho at 329, 193 P.3d at 876. Had the 1999 case ruling been
final for purposes of appeal, the state would have used the court’s written order.
In addition, a review of Mr. Dempsey’s district court records shows the first
finding was not yet an appealable order when it was used in the second case. Mr.
Dempsey was found guilty of a probation violation in the 1999 case on 3/6/2007. R
440-448 (iCourt docket from State v. Shawn Dempsey, Ada Co. CR-FE-1999-1070,
17

attached as Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend). On
4/6/2007, the court in the 2002 case considered that finding to be res judicata and
used it to find Mr. Dempsey guilty of a probation violation. R 449-460 (iCourt docket
from State of Idaho vs. Shawn Dempsey, Ada Co. CR-FE-2002-617 attached as
Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend). However, the
probation violation in the 1999 case was not “final” for purposes of appeal until
5/25/2007 when a “Final Judgment, Order Or Decree” was entered. R 447. Thus,
the Court of Appeals considered the probation violation found in the 1999 case to be
final for res judicata purposes even though it was not yet an appealable order.
Dempsey and the Restatement show the trial court’s finding that Count I was
not proved was final for purposes of res judicata. The post-conviction court erred in
holding to the contrary.
4. Counsel’s performance was deficient when she failed to object.
The probation violation hearings took place in 2015. Dempsey was decided in
2008. The five factors required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of
an issue were announced in 2007. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, supra. Counsel should
have been aware of these precedents and objected to the state’s refiling of Count I.
Moreover, if the failure to object was intentional, it was unreasonable because, as
noted above, no strategic or tactical purpose could have been served by letting the
state get an undeserved second change to prove Count I. See McKay v. State, supra.
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B.

The evidence establishes a prima facie case that Mr. Standley was
prejudiced because there was not sufficient evidence to prove Count
II.
Special condition (e) was not violated. That condition required Mr. Standley

to “complete the Suboxone program that he is currently enrolled in” and not quit
“the program prior to the completion date as recommended by Dr. Hadlock.” The
court only found Mr. Standley was not in strict compliance with all of the terms of
the treatment agreement because he wasn’t taking all of his medication. That fact
does not constitute a violation of special condition (e) because the word “quit” means
to “[s]top or discontinue (an action or activity).”4 The court’s finding that Mr.
Standley quit the program because he was in non-compliance with one aspect of the
program is in error because it pushes the meaning of the word “quit” outside the
bounds of the English language. Mr. Standley quit taking some but not all of his
medication. He did not quit the program.
Moreover, the court did not consider Dr. Hadlock’s testimony that Mr.
Standley had been participating in all components of the Suboxone program and
Mr. Standley’s performance was “phenomenal.” T pg. 82, ln. 22. It also failed to
consider Dr. Hadlock’s testimony that it is “addict behavior” for patients “to actually
practice medicine on themselves” and part of the goal of treatment is “to change
that behavior, that’s part of the addictive behavior.” T pg. 83, ln. 22 - pg. 84, ln. 4.
It also failed to consider Dr. Hadlock’s testimony that many patients in the program

4
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are not in total compliance with their medication regime. T pg. 84, ln. 25. It also
failed to consider Dr. Hadlock’s testimony that if Mr. Standley forgot a dose he was
to refrain from taking it. The number of extra strips could be explained if Mr.
Standley had forgotten just 5 of his 60 doses per month. T pg. 96, ln. 22-25. Finally,
the court did not consider the doctor’s testimony that Mr. Standley was still in his
Suboxone program and that special arrangements had been made for him since he
was returned to jail. T pg. 90, ln. 23-25.
The above evidence also shows Mr. Standley was meaningfully participating
in the treatment in compliance with general condition of probation #15. The postconviction court found that Mr. Standley did not meaningfully participate in the
treatment because did not strictly comply with the medication requirements.
A significant component of the Petitioner's probation was that he
continued with the Suboxone medication treatment program. A
significant component of the treatment program was that the
Petitioner only take the Suboxone medication in doses prescribed by
his treating physician. The Petitioner's deliberate failure to take the
Suboxone medication as prescribed over an extended period of time
without consulting his treating physician sufficiently supports the
Court’s finding that the Petitioner failed to meaningfully participate in
the treatment program. The Petitioner’s lack of candor for his failure
to take the Suboxone medication as prescribed as evidence by his
conflicting explanations further supports the finding that the
Petitioner was not meaningfully participating in the treatment
program as directed.
R 429. This finding is in error for several reasons.
First the trial court never made a finding Mr. Standley failed to meaningfully
participate in the treatment program. It found Mr. Standley failed to obtain 100%
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compliance with the program. The trial court said:
So there were two components of that order. One component is if he
quits, he violates probation, no question about it. And second, that he
complete the program. Well, there is no question in my mind that Mr.
Standley has not followed that program like he was directed. . . . And
clearly failing to follow the prescribed routine of taking two Suboxones
a day was the deal. It’ s not up to Mr. Standley to make that decision. I
could care less whether 90 percent or a hundred percent of the world
failed under these programs and failed to follow the instructions.
That's not the issue. The issue is you were told what to do. You made a
different decision. This isn't a medical issue. It is an issue, Mr.
Standley, very simply, that you on your own decided to change the
program. That violates this probation, and you are, in fact, in violation
of probation on Count 2.
But, the issue wasn’t Mr. Standley decided to “change the program,” the question
was whether, even with those changes, he was “meaningfully participating” in the
program. That is a question the trial court never addressed.
Moreover, the post-conviction court does not apply the plain meaning of the
word “meaningfully” in reaching its conclusion. “Meaningfully” means done “in a
serious, important, or worthwhile manner.”5 It does not mean 100% compliance.
Dr. Hadlock testified he did not expect perfect compliance with the treatment
agreement because it is not unusual for patients to be noncompliant and “some
latitude” is given when they have violations of the agreement. T pg. 88, ln. 19-20;
pg. 89, ln. 4-11. Mr. Standley did not violate general condition # 15 because he was
meaningfully participating in the program even if he was not in 100% compliance
with one of the terms.

5
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Even considering the change in medication, Dr. Hadlock testified Mr.
Standley had been participating in all components of the Suboxone program. T pg.
82, ln. 22. Dr. Hadlock also testified it is “addict behavior” for patients “to actually
practice medicine on themselves” and part of the goal of treatment is “to change
that behavior, that’s part of the addictive behavior.” T pg. 83, ln. 22 - pg. 84, ln. 4.
And, Dr. Hadlock testified many patients in the program are not in total compliance
with their medication regime. T pg. 84, ln. 25.
In fact, Mr. Standley was meaningfully participating in the treatment in
compliance with general condition of probation #15. Mr. Standley was meaningfully
participating because all of his urine tests were clean. The fact Mr. Standley was
abstaining from using heroin, by itself, shows his meaningful participation in the
program. After all, the purpose of the program is to prevent heroin use. In
addition, however, he had attended IOP aftercare and relapse prevention, and he
was attending and leading some of the community support meetings. T pg. 100, ln.
12-19.
Mr. Standley was prejudiced under Strickland by defense counsel’s failure to
object to the relitigation of Count I because there was insufficient evidence to show
he violated Count II. And, in the absence of sufficient evidence of either probation
violation, the court could not have validly found a probation violation, revoked the
probation, or imposed the sentence. Even if it had, Mr. Standley could have
presented the issue on appeal and prevailed.
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C.

The court abused its discretion in failing to rule on the Motion to
Take Judicial Notice.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d) places a mandatory duty on district courts to

take judicial notice when a party makes an oral or written request. The postconviction court violated this duty in this case, and the violation was prejudicial to
Mr. Standley, as the documents further established there was a final judgment in
his case for purposes of res judicata. Therefore, the order of summary dismissal
must be vacated.
The Evidence Rule provides:
(d) When mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written request
that a court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from
the court file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify
the specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is
requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties copies of
such documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice if requested
by a party and supplied with the necessary information.

Mr. Standley’s motion read:
Wes Standley asks this Court to take judicial notice of the iCourt
dockets in State v. Shawn Dempsey, Ada Co. CR-FE-1999-1070, and
State of Idaho vs. Shawn Dempsey, Ada Co. CR-FE-2002-617. This
motion is made pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d). True and correct copies of
the dockets are attached to the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Alter or Amend filed on May 25, 2017.
R 467. True and correct copies of the dockets were in fact attached to the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend. R 440-460. The court
denied the Motion to Alter or Amend without ruling on the motion for judicial
notice. Thus, the district court violated its mandatory duty to take judicial notice.
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Mr. Standley’s request identified the specific documents and items requested.
Reversal is required when a district court violates a mandatory duty. State v.
Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 727, 852 P.2d 87, 94 (1992). But, even if a harmless error
analysis applies, Martin & Martin Custom Homes, LLC v. Camas County, 150 Idaho
508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011), the error was not harmless in this case. As explained
above, the district court documents in the Dempsey cases show Mr. Dempsey was
found guilty of a probation violation in the 1999 case on 3/6/2007. R 440-448. That
guilty finding was not “final” for purposes of appeal until 5/25/2007 when a “Final
Judgment, Order Or Decree” was entered. R 447. Nevertheless, the court in the
2002 case considered that finding to be res judicata and used it to find Mr. Dempsey
guilty of a probation violation on 4/6/2007, seven weeks before the 1999 case was
appealable. R 449-460. Thus, in affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals
in Dempsey considered the probation violation found in the 1999 case to be final for
res judicata purposes even though it was not yet an appealable order, as it found all
five requirements of res judicata to be present. State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho at 331,
193 P.3d at 878.
The district court record in Dempsey conclusively demonstrates there was a
final judgment in this case and the post-conviction court erred in concluding
otherwise. For these reasons, the order of summary dismissal should be vacated
and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Wesly Standley asks this Court to vacate the
order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand to the district
court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 2017.

/s/Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Wesly Standley
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